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THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
COUNSEL OF CHOICE: AN EXERCISE IN
THE WEIGHING OF UNARTICULATED
VALUES
EUGENE L. SHAPIRO*
I. WHEAT V. UNITED STATES: RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT
When, in May of 1988, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the
Sixth Amendment encompassed a criminal defendant's interest in re-
taining counsel of the defendant's choice, it did so with a tone often
reserved for statements of the obvious. Wheat v. United States1 does
not bear the usual indicia of a landmark decision. The Court tersely
accepted, as an outgrowth of its prior holdings, petitioner's claim that
the disqualification of his retained attorney because of a potential con-
flict of interest affected a cognizable right under the Sixth Amend-
ment.' The Court focused its discussion on both the scope of the right
and the process by which the presumption in favor of a defendant's
counsel of choice might be outweighed.
In fact, the Supreme Court had seldom discussed choice of re-
tained counsel and had done so only peripherally in the Sixth Amend-
ment context. Its strongest statement on the subject was in Powell v.
Alabama,3 an opinion that highlighted the importance of such choice
in a narrow context aid that preceded the application of the Sixth
Amendment's right to counsel to the states by over thirty years.' In
Powell the defendants, blacks who had been convicted of rape and sen-
* Professor of Law, Memphis State University School of Law. B.A. 1968, Harpur
College, S.U.N.Y. Binghamton; J.D. 1972, University of Virginia; LL.M. (Cr.J.) 1973,
New York University.
1. 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
2. See id. at 158-59. The Court noted that the Sixth Amendment "secures the
right to the assistance of counsel, by appointment if necessary, in a trial for any serious
crime." Id. at 158 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)). It further noted
that the purpose of providing such assistance is to ensure that the defendant receives a
fair trial, id. at 159 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984)), and
added that "the right to select and be represented by one's preferred attorney" is "thus"
comprehended by the Amendment. Id. (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983); Mor-
ris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983)).
3. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
4. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339-44 (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel applies to the states).
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tenced to death after a trial that "from beginning to end, took place in
an atmosphere of tense, hostile and excited public senti-
ment,"Ochallenged their convictions as violative of due process. The de-
fendants were not represented between arraignment and trial.6 Fur-
ther, they were not asked if they were able to employ counsel, if
friends or relatives might help them to do so, or if they wished to have
counsel appointed. 7 The court designated a defense attorney on the
morning of the trial, and the defense attorney proceeded to present a
pro forma defense with insufficient opportunity for effective prepara-
tion.' The Supreme Court stated:
In the light of the facts outlined. . .- the ignorance and illiteracy
of the defendants, their youth, the circumstances of public hostility,
the imprisonment and the close surveillance of the defendants by the
military forces, the fact that their friends and families were all in
other states and communication with them necessarily difficult, and
above all that they stood in deadly peril of their lives-we think the
failure of the trial court to give them reasonable time and opportunity
to secure counsel was a clear denial of due process.'
It was clear to the Court that the opportunity to obtain counsel must
involve an exercise of the defendant's personal choice. "It is hardly
necessary to say that, the right to counsel being conceded, a defendant
should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own
choice." 10
Before Wheat, issues involving choice of counsel also had arisen in
the context of challenges to the denial of a continuance sought for the
purpose of retaining an attorney. In Ungar v. Sarafite"11 and similar
cases, the Court made it clear that such a denial would appropriately
be assessed under the standard of whether it was so arbitrary as to
violate due process. 12 In Flanagan v. United States,"3 the principal
5. Powell, 287 U.S. at 51.
6. Id. at 57.
7. Id. at 52.
8. Id. at 57-58.
9. Id. at 71. With regard to the effectiveness of the appointment, the Court added:
[A]ssuming their inability, even if opportunity had been given, to employ
counsel ... we are of the opinion that, under the circumstances just stated,
the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial
court to make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due
process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
10. Id. at 53.
11. 376 U.S. 575 (1964).
12, Id. at 589; see also Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10 (1954) (finding that deny-
ing the defendant an opportunity to retain any counsel violated due process); cf. Morris
v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1983) (holding that the denial of a continuance that would
[Vol. 43
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pre-Wheat opinion in which the Court had discussed the claim that a
defendant's choice of counsel is an interest protected under the Sixth
Amendment, 4 the Court did not resolve the issue. Instead, it held that
federal law does not permit the immediate appeal of a pretrial disqual-
ification ruling.15
It therefore was not surprising that in Wheat the Government
took the position that the implication of the Sixth Amendment by the
disqualification remained an unresolved issue and that the Court
should assess the matter only under the Due Process Clause's prohibi-
tion against arbitrary or unreasonable impediments to the defense.,'
The Government argued:
The Sixth Amendment ensures an accused "the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence"; it does not suggest that the defendant is
entitled to the attorney of his choice. Moreover, the purpose of the
Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel "is simply to en-
sure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial." Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). See also United States v. Mor-
rison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981). It is not designed to guarantee "a
meaningful relationship" between a defendant and the counsel of his
choice. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13 (1982). 1"
Thus, while denying the applicability of the Sixth Amendment, the
Government asserted that the purposes of the right to counsel could be
reduced to one "simple" goal: that of securing a fair trial.' s In its opin-
ion the Court adopted the Government's distillation of this far-reach-
ing statement from the quoted language of Strickland.0
Wheat squarely rejected the notion that the guarantees of due
process provide the only constitutional framework for measuring an
impediment to a defendant's choice of retained counsel. The parame-
ters of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice were, however,
"circumscribed" at the outset.2" Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that a defendant is entitled neither to representation
by one who is not admitted to the bar, nor by an attorney he cannot
have allowed the Deputy Public Defender to try the case rather than a senior trial attor-
ney in the Public Defender's Office did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel).
13. 465 U.S.-259 (1984).
14. See id. at 267-68.
15. Id. at 269.
16. Brief for the United States at 6-7, Wheat (No. 87-4).
17. Id. at 11.
18. Id.
19. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988).
20. Id. at 159.
1992]
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afford or who declines to represent him. 21 "Nor may a defendant insist
on the counsel of an attorney who has a previous or ongoing relation-
ship with an opposing party, even when the opposing party is the Gov-
ernment. 2 2 Viewing the question before it as whether a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right is similarly "qualified" by the attorney's repre-
sentation of other alleged conspirators, 23 the Court then proceeded to
outline a methodology for resolving the issue. The Court noted that a
Sixth Amendment presumption exists in favor of counsel of choice,
24
but that the presumption may be overcome by sufficient countervailing
interests.25
What began in the opinion as an apparent list of definitional limi-
tations on the right to counsel thus evolved into a kind of balancing
approach for determining which sorts of interferences will be permissi-
ble. This fusion of the right's apparent limitations with the methodol-
ogy for evaluating an alleged abridgement casts doubt upon the defini-
tional status of the initial limitations themselves. The consequences
may be significant. At first glance it appears to matter little if the qual-
ification limiting the right to the choice of duly admitted counsel is
deemed definitional28 or is instead the product of a balancing of the
defendant's right to choice against the state's obviously substantial in-
terests in regulating the practice of law. On the other hand, courts
often grapple with such issues as the extent to which former prosecu-
tors' experiences may require their disqualification as defense counsel.
In these situations a reading of Wheat that views the Sixth Amend-
ment right as inapplicable "by definition" to the choice of an attorney
who has had a previous relationship with the Government would be
dispositive. It is improbable that the Court intended such a result.
Rather, Wheat seems to require a careful weighing of the particular-
ized facts and interests in each case.
This weighing process led the Wheat Court to conclude that the
disqualification of counsel was within the trial court's discretion.
27
Wheat was charged with participating in a conspiracy to distribute
drugs. A jury had acquitted one alleged conspirator, Gomez-Barajas, on
charges related to Wheat's and, in order to avoid a second trial on
other charges, Gomez-Barajas offered to plead guilty to tax evasion and
illegal importation. The district court had not accepted this plea by the
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 160.
25. Id. at 164.
26. Id. at 159 ("[tlhe Sixth Amendment right to choose one's own [duly admitted]
counsel").
27. Id. at 164.
[Vol. 43
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time of Wheat's trial. The same attorney represented another alleged
conspirator, Bravo. Bravo pleaded guilty to transportation of drugs in
lieu of being tried on the conspiracy charge. After those plea proceed-
ings the attorney informed the district court that Wheat had asked
him to try his case.28 The district court postponed consideration of this
request for a substitution of counsel
9 until the day before trial.30
At the hearing the Government argued that the attorney's prior
representation of the two codefendants created a serious conflict of in-
terest. It asserted that because the court had not accepted the Gomez-
Barajas plea arrangement, a possible rejection would lead to Gomez-
Barjas's trial. Because Wheat was familiar with the sources and size of
Gomez-Barajas's income, the Government predicted that Wheat would
likely be called as a witness. Thus, a conflict of interest would prevent
the attorney from cross-examining Wheat. 1 The prosecution also re-
quested that Bravo be made available as a witness at Wheat's trial in
exchange for a sentencing concession. Bravo had been accused of deliv-
ering marijuana to a third party's home, and the Government believed
that Wheat had received a portion of it. Therefore, full cross-examina-
tion of Bravo also would be foreclosed by a conflict.32
In response, Wheat argued that the circumstances envisioned by
the prosecution were highly speculative. If called as a witness, Bravo
would assert that he did not know Wheat and impeachment would not
be necessary.3 3 Wheat also asserted that the conflict was engineered to
interfere with his choice of counsel.3 4 Wheat argued that a trial of
Gomez-Barajas was unlikely, and because he was not involved in the
crimes charged, his testifying was improbable.3 5 Finally, all of the de-
fendants consented to the attorney's representation of Wheat and
agreed to waive all future claims of conflict of interest.3 8
In considering the propriety of the district court's ruling, the
Court observed that the waivers did not alleviate the problems that a
conflict of interest might present. It noted that "[flederal courts have
an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted
28. Id. at 154-55.
29. In dissent Justices Stevens and Blackmun took issue with this characterization.
They viewed the request as one for additional counsel of choice. Id. at 172-73 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (Blackmun, J., joining in dissent).
30. Id. at 155.
31. Id. at 155-56.
32. Id. at 156.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 157. In dissent Justices Marshall and Brennan found this to be a signifi-
cant possibility. Id. at 170-71 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Brennan, J., joining in
dissent).
35. Id. at 156-57.
36. Id. at 157.
1992]
5
Shapiro: The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Choice: An Exercise in th
Published by Scholar Commons, 1992
SOUTH CAROLINA LAw RE iVEw
within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceed-
ings appear fair to all who observe them. ' 37 In addition, the Court
weighed both the institutional interest in the rendition of just verdicts
and the legitimate wishes of the district courts to avoid appellate inef-
fective assistance claims.38 The Court concluded that the presumption
in favor of counsel of choice may be overcome and a waiver refused
either when an actual conflict is demonstrated or a serious potential for
conflict exists.39 Wheat presented the latter situation, and the Court
accorded broad latitude to the district court in evaluating the facts.
40
Although Wheat mandates the weighing of a presumption in favor
of a defendant's choice against competing interests, the opinion pro-
vides little guidance concerning the strength of that presumption, a
key question to any meaningful implementation of the right to choose.
The opinion provides surprisingly little information from which to in-
fer a standard for assessing governmental interests or, more specifi-
cally, to determine how such interests should be viewed in light of the
values underlying the Sixth Amendment right. This paucity of infor-
mation seems to be a direct result of the Court's failure to discuss the
source of the right in depth. Why is it that the Sixth Amendment pro-
vides presumptive protection for a criminal defendant's choice in re-
taining an attorney? What is it about the amendment-its language,
structure, or the values that it was intended to further-that led the
Court to conclude that the very process of choosing an attorney in-
volved an interest within the Sixth Amendment's scope?
The Court's discussion is brief:
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees that "[uln
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." In United States v.
Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981), we observed that this right was
designed to assure fairness in the adversary criminal process. Realiz-
ing that an unaided layman may have little skill in arguing the law or
in coping with an intricate procedural system, Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 69 (1932); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 307 (1973), we
have held that the Sixth Amendment secures the right to the assis-
37. Id. at 160. The court then cited the limitations imposed upon multiple repre-
sentation by the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, its
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and the rules of the California Bar Associa-
tion, which governed the attorneys in Wheat. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 1.7 (1990); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIrry DR 5-105(C) (1980);
CAL. PROFESSIONAL RULES CODE Rules 5-101 to -104, 7-103 (West 1981); CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE §§ 6000-6228 (West 1990 & Supp. 1991).
38. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160-63.
39. Id. at 163.
40. Id. at 164.
[Vol. 43
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tance of counsel, by appointment if necessary. . .. We have further
recognized that the purpose of providing assistance of counsel "is sim-
ply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial," Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984), and that in evaluating Sixth
Amendment claims, "the appropriate inquiry focuses on the adver-
sarial process, not on the accused's relationship with his lawyer as
such." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657, n.21 (1984). Thus,
while the right to select and be represented by one's preferred attor-
ney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of
the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each crimi-
nal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably
be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers. See Morris v. Slappy,
461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983)."'
Although the last-quoted sentence seems to address the extreme posi-
tion that the honoring of a defendant's choice of counsel must be "in-
exorable," one might perceive that the tone of the entire passage iso-
lates the Sixth Amendment's goal of assuring a fair trial as the sole
purpose of the right to counsel. However, in view of the precedents
cited and the present state of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, it is
unlikely that the Court intended such a major shift in its position.4
2
The quoted language from Strickland never purported to set forth
a comprehensive view of the Sixth Amendment's goals. The language
appeared in the portion of Strickland that described the two-pronged
test for assessing claims which allege ineffective assistance of counsel.43
The Court required a showing that counsel made errors which fell be-
low an objective standard of reasonableness and which prejudiced the
defense in such a way that deprives the defendant of "a fair trial, a
trial whose result is reliable."'4 In discussing the first requirement and
the methods by which reasonable assistance might be gauged, the
Court reviewed the possibility of a "checklist" for evaluating attorney
performance:
No particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfacto-
rily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense
counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to re-
present a criminal defendant .... Indeed, the existence of detailed
guidelines for representation could distract counsel from the overrid-
ing mission of vigorous advocacy of the defendant's cause. Moreover,
the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amend-
41. Id. at 158-59. The next paragraph outlined the circumscribed nature of the
right.
42. See Fuller v. Diesslin, 868 F.2d 604, 610 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 203
(1989); see also infra text accompanying notes 267-68.
43. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 (1984).
44. Id. at 687.
1992]
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ment is not to improve the quality of legal representation, although
that is a goal of considerable importance to the legal system. The pur-
pose is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.
4
1
Similarly, footnote twenty-one of United States v. Cronic46 was
concerned with the narrower right to the effective assistance of coun-
sel. After observing that a criminal trial is neither a game nor a gladia-
torial sacrifice, 47 the Court added, "[T]he appropriate inquiry focuses
on the adversarial process, not on the accused's relationship with his
lawyer as such. If counsel is a reasonably effective advocate, he meets
constitutional standards irrespective of his client's evaluation of his
performance."' 8
Also relevant to an interpretation of this portion of Wheat is the
Court's simultaneous rejection of the Government's position that the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides the appropriate
standard for analysis.49 If the Court's concern had extended solely to
the issue of a fair trial, that provision would have been adequately
suited to an assessment of the matter. In addition, confining the values
served by the right to counsel to the goal of providing a fair trial would
not have been entirely consistent with the tenor of other observations
by the Court concerning the focus of the Sixth Amendment-most no-
tably those observations made during the course of the Court's recogni-
tion of a defendant's right to self-representation in Faretta v.
California.8
In Faretta the Court found that the Sixth Amendment right to the
assistance of counsel was provided as an aid to the right of the accused
to personally defend. 51 The right to make one's defense had its source
in the intent of the framers52 and in the language of the Amendment,
53
despite the procedural disadvantage often incurred by one who chooses
to exercise it. "It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions de-
fendants could better defend with counsel's guidance than by their
own unskilled efforts. '54 Nevertheless, the "inestimable worth of free
45. Id. at 688-89 (emphasis added).
46. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
47. Id. at 657 (quoting United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975)).
48. Id. at 657 n.21 (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983); Morris v. Slappy,
461 U.S. 1 (1983)).
49. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 158-59 (1988).
50. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
51. Id. at 819-20.
52. See id. at 826-27.
53. Id. at 819.
54. Id. at 834.
[Vol. 43
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choice" 55 recognized by those who wrote the Bill of Rights56 requires an
acknowledgement that "although he may conduct his own defense ulti-
mately to his own detriment, [a defendant's] choice must be honored
out of 'that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the
law.' M75
Wheat suggested no reasons why the Sixth Amendment's counsel
provision, a "supplement" to this design, 58 should serve narrower inter-
ests. In fact, the Court's sole reference to Faretta gives no indication
that Faretta's policies were to be disturbed. In a rather obvious state-
ment of the scope of Faretta's holding, the Court apparently reaf-
firmed its vitality. "Our holding in Faretta v. California, that a crimi-
nal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to represent himself if he
voluntarily elects to do so, does not encompass the right to choose any
advocate if the defendant wishes to be represented by counsel."5 9
In its opinion in Flanagan v. United States in 1984,60 the Court
itself raised the possibility that a right to counsel of choice might be
protected by some interest other than the goal of providing a fair
trial,61 although the Court resolved neither that issue nor the basic
question of whether the right was constitutionally protected.62 Instead,
it confined itself to the issue of whether pretrial disqualification is im-
mediately appealable as a final collateral order under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.3 The Court reviewed the congressional policy against piece-
meal review and noted that in the context of a criminal case that policy
is especially strong. 4 The rule that bars appellate review until final
judgment permits an exception only when a collateral order meets the
three stringent conditions set forth in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay.65
First, the order "'must conclusively determine the disputed question';
second, it must 'resolve an important issue completely separate from
the merits of the action'; third, it must 'be effectively unreviewable on
55. Id.
56. Id. at 833-34.
57. Id. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
58. See id. at 820.
59. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 n.3 (1988) (citation omitted). This
statement footnoted the observation that individuals who are not members of the bar
may not represent clients other than themselves. Id. at 159.
60. 465 U.S. 259 (1984).
61. Id. at 268-70.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).
64. Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 264 (quoting United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co.,
458 U.S. 263, 265 (1982) (per curiam) (quoting Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S.
323, 325 (1940))).
65. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
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appeal from a final judgment.' "86
The Court noted that a disqualification order "lacks the critical
characteristics" of other types of interlocutory orders that are "imme-
diately appealable in criminal cases."'6 7 Examining whether such an or-
der nevertheless satisfied the three Coopers & Lybrand conditions, the
Court continued:
Petitioners correctly concede that postconviction review of a dis-
qualification .order is fully effective to the extent that the asserted
right to counsel of one's choice is like, for example, the Sixth Amend-
ment right to -represent oneself. Obtaining reversal for violation of
such a right does not require a showing of prejudice to the defense,
since the right reflects constitutional protection of the defendant's
free choice independent of concern for the objective fairness of the
proceeding.. .. In sum, as petitioners concede, if establishing a viola-
tion of their asserted right requires no showing of prejudice to their
defense, a pretrial order violating the right does not meet the third
condition . . . it is not "effectively unreviewable on appeal from a fi-
nal judgment."
If, on the other hand, petitioners' asserted right is one that is not
violated absent some specifically demonstrated prejudice to the de-
fense, a disqualification order still falls outside the coverage of the
collateral-order exception. 8
The Court then stated that it need not consider whether the third
Coopers & Lybrand condition was satisfied because "the second...
condition-that the order be truly collateral-is not satisfied if [the]
asserted right is one requiring prejudice to the defense for its viola-
tion."6 9 Although Flanagan left the issue unresolved, it certainly raised
the possibility that interests "independent of concern for the objective
fairness of the proceeding" might be implicated by the recognition of a
right to counsel of choice.
7 0
The analytical vacuum created by Wheat, in which a presumption
of indeterminate strength might be overcome by governmental inter-
66. Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 265 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468).
67. Id. at 266-67. Orders denying a motion to reduce bail or to dismiss an indict-
ment on double jeopardy or on speech or debate grounds had been recognized as imme-
diately appealable. The rights guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy and Speech or Debate
Clauses involve more than the right not to be convicted. They involve the right not to be
tried. Id. at 266. "[Tlhe asserted rights in all three situations would be irretrievably lost
if review were postponed until trial is completed." Id.
68. Id. at 267-68 (citations omitted) (quoting id. at 265).
69. Id. at 268. If this is the case, "[tihe effect of the disqualification on the defense,
and hence whether the asserted right has been violated, cannot be fairly assessed until
the substance of the prosecution's and defendant's cases is known." Id. at 268-69. The
order, although final, would not be independent of the issues to be tried. Id. at 268.
70. Id. at 268 (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177-78 n.8 (1984)).
[Vol. 43
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ests that may or may not serve the unstated values underlying the
right to counsel of choice, seems to have been perceived by two of the
dissenters. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, stated his gen-
eral agreement with the view that the right to counsel of choice is not
absolute, but rather necessitates a presumption in favor of the accept-
ance of a defendant's decision.7 1 Taking issue with the Court's applica-
tion of these principles to the facts before it 2 and especially with its
"unwarranted deference" to the trial court's decision,73 Justice Mar-
shall focused on the significance of the right to counsel of choice within
the overall framework of the Sixth Amendment. He observed that the
Court's statements in earlier cases concerning the defendant's choice of
counsel "stem largely from an appreciation that a primary purpose of
the Sixth Amendment is to grant a criminal defendant effective control
over the conduct of his defense. '74 Adding that the defendant's per-
sonal right to make a defense, acknowledged in Faretta, is related to
71. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 166 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Brennan,
J., joining in dissent).
72. Id. at 168-71. Justice Marshall found that the Government failed to show that
the multiple representation posed a substantial risk of a serious conflict of interest im-
periling the prospect of a fair trial. Id. at 168-69. He found that at the time of Wheat's
trial the attorney had effectively completed his representation of Gomez-Barajas and
that Gomez-Barajas was neither scheduled to appear as a witness nor likely to be ques-
tioned. The argument that the trial court might have rejected Gomez-Barajas's plea
agreement and that he might have proceeded to trial rested, according to Justice Mar-
shall, "on speculation of the most dubious kind." Id. at 169. He noted that even if this
occurred, Wheat probably would not have testified at that trial because no indication
existed that he had any involvement in or information about crimes for which Gomez-
Barajas might yet have stood trial. In fact, Gomez-Barajas had been acquitted of con-
spiracy to distribute marijuana, which was the only alleged connection between Gomez-
Barajas and Wheat. Id. at 169-70. As to Bravo, Justice Marshall denied that his testi-
mony created a serious potential for conflict.
Bravo could not have testified about petitioner's involvement in the alleged
marijuana distribution scheme. As all parties were aware at the time, Bravo
did not know and could not identify petitioner; indeed, prior to the commence-
ment of legal proceedings, the two men never had heard of each other. Bravo's
eventual testimony at petitioner's trial related to a shipment of marijuana in
which petitioner was not involved .... Petitioner's counsel did not cross-ex-
amine Bravo, and neither petitioner's counsel nor the prosecutor mentioned
Bravo's testimony in closing argument.
Id. at 170. The insignificance of Bravo's testimony to any matter in dispute, coupled with
the timing of the prosecutor's decision to call him, raised a "serious concern" that the
prosecutor had attempted to manufacture a conflict. Id. at 170 n.3. Finally, Justice Mar-
shall found the allegation of a conflict "nothing short of ludicrous" in light of the pos-
sibilities that counsel could have been added to, rather than substituted for, the defense
team and could have been ordered not to take part in the cross-examination of Bravo.
Id. at 171.
73. Id. at 166-68.
74. Id. at 165.
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this principle, he noted that "[a]n obviously critical aspect of making a
defense is choosing a person to serve as an assistant and
representative.""'
Justice Marshall also stated that the fairness and integrity of
criminal trials are generally promoted by the defendant's selection of
counsel.76 In his dissent Justice Stevens briefly echoed this recognition
of an institutional value that is served by the right. Joined by Justice
Blackmun, Justice Stevens chided the majority for demonstrating "'its
apparent unawareness of the function of the independent lawyer as a
guardian of our freedom.' "7 Although Justice Stevens agreed with
Justice Marshall's assessment of the facts and his judgment that the
district court abused its discretion, Justice Stevens nevertheless shared
the majority's view that judges should be afforded wide latitude in rul-
ing upon such motions.
7 8
II. THE FEE FORFEITURE CASES
The Court's most recent opportunity to discuss the nature of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice arose in the fee forfeiture
cases of Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States7" and United
States v. Monsanto." Both cases involved issues that concerned the
scope and constitutionality of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of
1984,81 which authorizes the forfeiture of property acquired as the re-
sult of racketeering (RICO)82 and continuing criminal enterprise
(CCE) 3 offenses. Unfortunately, while the results of these cases prom-
ise to be of broad practical significance, the opinions of the Court
added very little to its earlier discussion of the doctrinal foundations of
the right to counsel of choice.
Each case emphasized different aspects of the statutory scheme. In
Caplin & Drysdale the petitioner law firm represented Reckmeyer,
who was charged with conducting a drug importation and distribution
scheme alleged to constitute a continuing criminal enterprise.
Reckmeyer retained the firm during the grand jury proceedings. The
75. Id. at 166.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 172 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Walters v. National Ass'n of Radia-
tion Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 371 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
78. Id. at 172-73.
79. 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
80. 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
81. Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040-
53 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 19, 21, and 28 U.S.C.).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988).
83. 21 U.S.C. §§ 848, 853 (1988).
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indictment sought forfeiture of certain assets in Reckmeyer's posses-
sion pursuant to section 853(a)(1) of the CCE statute.84 Section
853(a)(1) authorizes forfeiture "to the United States . . . [of] any
property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds. . obtained, di-
rectly or indirectly, as the result of such violation."85 After indictment
the district court acted pursuant to its statutory authority to "preserve
the availability"8 of the specified assets and entered an ex parte re-
straining order forbidding their transfer by Reckmeyer. Despite this
order, Reckmeyer paid the firm approximately $25,000 for preindict-
ment services. The firm placed this money in an escrow account.1
7
Caplin & Drysdale continued to represent Reckmeyer, and he
moved to modify the restraining order to permit the use of some of the
contested assets to pay the firm's fees and to exempt such legal fees
from postconviction forfeiture. Before the hearing on this motion
Reckmfeyer entered into a plea agreement. By the terms of the agree-
ment he pleaded guilty to the CCE charge and agreed to forfeit all of
the assets specified in the indictment. After the plea was entered, the
court denied Reckmeyer's earlier motion to modify the restraining or-
der. Later, in conjunction with sentencing, it entered an order that re-
quired Reckmeyer to forfeit virtually all of the assets in his
possession.8
Caplin & Drysdale then filed a petition pursuant to section 853(n)
of the statute, which permits a third party that asserts an interest in
forfeited property to request a hearing to adjudicate the merits of the
claim.19 The firm claimed the $25,000 in the escrow account for pre-
indictment services, as well as over $170,000 for additional services. It
argued that assets used to pay attorney fees are exempt from forfeiture
under section 853, and, if not, that the omission of such an exemption
renders the statute unconstitutional. Section 853(n)(6)(B) of the stat-
ute permits a petitioner to establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the petitioner is a "bona fide purchaser for value of the
right, title, or interest in the property and was at the time of purchase
reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to
forfeiture.""' Relying on this provision, the district court found that
Caplin & Drysdale "was a good faith provider of services for value"9' 2
84. Id. § 853(a)(1).
85. Id.
86. Id. § 853(e)(1).
87. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 620 (1989).
88. Id. at 621.
89. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2) (1988).
90. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 621.
91. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B) (1988).
92. United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (E.D. Va. 1986) (mere.),
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and that Congress had not intended to authorize the forfeiture of bona
fide attorney fees. 9 3 The court also concluded that such an authoriza-
tion would violate a defendant's right to counsel of choice and to the
effective assistance of counsel.9 '
A panel of the Fourth Circuit unanimously affirmed the district
court's "order[] exempting legitimate attorney fees from forfeiture."95
Although the panel concluded that the Act did indeed authorize the
forfeiture of assets to be used for legitimate attorney fees, it held that
such an application of the statute "violates the 'qualified' right to
counsel of choice."96 The Fourth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and
reversed.97 The court agreed that Congress did not intend to exempt
attorney fees from forfeiture, but declined to recognize a Sixth Amend-
ment right "to pay an attorney with the illicit proceeds of drug trans-
actions. The difficult policy choices posed. . . provide no basis for the
creation of such a right."98 Central to the Fourth Circuit's analysis was
the Act's "relation-back" provision in section 853(c), which provides as
follows:
All right, title, and interest in property described in [section
853(a)] vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giv-
ing rise to forfeiture under this section. Any such property that is sub-
sequently transferred to a person other than the defendant may be
the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd sub noma. In
re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988)
(en banc), afJ'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617
(1989).
93. See id. at 1195.
94. Id.; accord United States v. Basset, 632 F. Supp. 1308, 1317 (D. Md. 1986)
(mem.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd sub
non. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir.
1988) (en banc), aff'd sub non. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S.
617 (1989).
95. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 909 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd sub norm. In re
Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en
banc), aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617
(1989).
96. Id. The panel held that the Act contemplated no special exemptions for such
fees. To the contrary, it found the language of the Act to be plain and unambiguous,
permitting no interpretation that would avoid the serious constitutional issue involved.
Id. at 913. The court acknowledged a contrary conclusion by most of the district courts
that had considered the issue. Id. at 914.
97. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th
Cir. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub noma. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491
U.S. 617 (1989).
98. Id. at 640.
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ordered forfeited to the United States . . .9
The Government's asserted interest in the disputed property therefore
vests at the time of the offense and predates any transfer to an attor-
ney.100 The court regarded the Government's claim to prior ownership
of the assets as dispositive of the Sixth Amendment claim. It charac-
terized the right to counsel of choice "as the 'right of any accused, if he
can provide counsel for himself by his own resources or through the
aid of his family or friends, to be represented by the attorney of his
choosing.' '"01 The court simply held that the right is inapplicable in
the context of fee forfeiture because the assumption that a defendant
wished to hire counsel with the defendant's own assets was "conspicu-
ously absent. °10 2 It observed that purely private or financial predica-
ments often may leave a defendant without the counsel of choice.103 Its
discussion of the legitimacy of the precise interests underlying the cre-
ation of a pre-existing governmental property claim was cursory, a
point not lost on the dissenters. 04 The court did, however, state that
"[t]he government has a strong interest in seeing that criminal assets
are not dissipated prior to trial" 0 5 and that a goal of the Act is to
"'strip these offenders and organizations of their economic power'"
through forfeiture.' °
United States v. Monsanto'°" presented the Court with several
contrasting views below. The Second Circuit found the statute's pre-
99. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988). The transferee may prevail by establishing in a hear-
ing pursuant to § 853(n)(6)(B) that the transferee "is a bona fide purchaser for value of
the right, title, or interest in the property and was at the time of purchase reasonably
without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture. "Id. § 853(n)(6)(B).
100. In re Forfeiture Hearing, 837 F.2d at 640.
101. Id. at 644 (emphasis added by court) (quoting United States v. Inman, 483
F.2d 738, 739-40 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 988 (1974)).
102. Id.
103. See id. at 645 (citing Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 23 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
104. Judge Phillips, dissenting, observed:
Indeed, the ultimate constitutional issue might well be framed precisely as
whether Congress may use this wholly fictive device of property law to cut off
this fundamental right of the accused in a criminal case....
Under developed principles defining the qualified right to counsel of
choice, the dispositive issue is whether there are countervailing governmental
interests that do justify the drastic expedient of freezing and ultimately forfeit-
ing the assets of RICO and CCE defendants to the point that they cannot
retain private counsel for their defense.
Id. at 652 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 644.
106. Id. at 648 (quoting S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191 (1984), reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374).
107. 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
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trial procedures to be infirm, but was divided as to the reasons. 08 The
defendant was charged in an indictment that alleged RICO, CCE, and
illegal possession of firearm counts. The Government also alleged that
two parcels of residential property valued at $365,000 and $35,000 in
cash were subject to forfeiture.109 On the day the indictment was un-
sealed, the district court granted the Government's section
853(e)(1)(A) ex parte motion, which requested a restraining order to
prevent Monsanto from disposing of the residential property pending
trial.110 To permit the use of some of the restrained assets to retain
counsel, Monsanto then moved to vacate the order. He also requested
that such fees be exempt from post-trial forfeiture under section
853(c), asserting both statutory grounds and his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel of choice. The district court denied the motion."'
On expedited appeal a divided panel of the Second Circuit con-
cluded that Congress did not intend to exempt legitimate attorney fees
from forfeiture or, if they did so intend, it was "certainly not clear
enough to warrant departure from the plain meaning of the statute.""'
1 2
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit held that "a post-restraining order
adversarial hearing'' 3 is required, at which the Government must
demonstrate "a probability of convincing a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt both that the defendant has violated the statute and that the
assets are subject to forfeiture.""14 The panel concluded that if the
Government meets this burden, a defendant has no Sixth Amendment
right to the exemption of attorney fees. 1 5 On the other hand, a finding
that the Government has not met its burden would preclude post-trial
forfeiture and would not prevent a defendant from securing counsel." 6
On remand the district court concluded that the restraining order was
108. United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc) (per
curiam), rev'd, 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
109. Id. at 1401.
110. See id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A) (1982)).
111. Id. The district court did, however, permit the use of "forfeitable assets to pay
Monsanto's counsel of choice to the extent of the rates established by the Criminal Jus-
tice Act." See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1988)).
112. United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 1987), reh'g en banc, 852
F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam), rev'd, 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
113. Id. at 82.
114. Id. at 83 (citations omitted). The panel noted that other courts required such a
hearing in the context of procedural due process challenges. See id.
115. Id. at 83, 85. The court agreed, however, that "forfeitable assets may be in-
vaded for the purpose of paying attorney's fees at [Criminal Justice Act] rates to any
private attorney of the defendant's choice who would be willing to represent him for such
compensation." Id. at 85. In his dissenting opinion Judge Oakes found the statute uncon-
stitutional. Id. at 87 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 84.
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proper.1 "
Monsanto's case proceeded to trial, where he was represented by
an appointed attorney.118 The Second Circuit's en banc decision in
Monsanto's favor was not rendered until the trial had nearly con-
cluded, and original counsel continued to represent Monsanto.'" The
jury convicted Monsanto and found that the assets could be
forfeited.1 0
On several differing grounds eight members of the Second Circuit
concluded that the order denying Monsanto's motion should be va-
cated and modified to permit him access to restrained assets to pay
legitimate attorney fees in connection with the criminal charges against
him.' 2' The court also held that such fees are exempt from post-trial
forfeiture. 122 Three concurring judges concluded that the statute au-
thorizes neither pretrial restraint nor post-trial forfeiture of funds if a
district court designates such funds as legal fees. 22 Three other con-
curring judges found such authorization, but believed that it violated a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel because of the lack of
sufficient countervailing governmental interests."2 4 Two judges agreed
with the panel's view that a hearing was constitutionally necessary to
the validity of a pretrial restraining order, finding it to be mandated by
due process. Nevertheless, these two judges regarded judicial creation
of the procedure as inappropriate. 12 5 Four dissenters agreed, in varying
degrees, with the original panel opinion."2 None of these opinions fore-
shadowed the Supreme Court's subsequent treatment of the Sixth
117. See United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1402 (2d Cir. 1988) (en bane)
(per curiam), rev'd, 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
118. See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 605 (1989).
119. See id. at 605 n.5.
120. Id. at 605 n.4.
121. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1402.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1405 (Winter, J., concurring), (Meskill & Newman, J.J., joining). Judge
Winter viewed § 853(e)(1) (A) and (c) of the Act as vesting district courts with discretion-
ary power to restrain assets identified in an indictment as subject to forfeiture. Id. at
1405-10. This "discretion is to be guided by traditional equitable principles that balance
the relative hardships to the parties." Id. at 1405. In his view the Government had "no
interest derived from the Act in preventing a defendant from making ordinary lawful
expenditures during the period from indictment to conviction, including expenditures for
the retention of private counsel." Id.
124. Id. at 1402-03 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring) (Oakes & Kearse, J.J., joining).
125. Id. at 1411 (Miner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Altinari, J.,
joining). Judges Miner and Altimari did not consider the issue of postconviction forfei-
ture ripe for review. Id.
126. Id. at 1412 (Mahoney, J., dissenting); id. at 1418 (Pierce, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); id. at 1419 (Cardamone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 1420 (Pratt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Amendment issue.
Most of the Supreme Court's opinion in Monsanto is devoted to
the scope of the statute's coverage. The Court concluded that neither
the statutory description of forfeitable property nor the provisions that
govern pretrial restraining orders require, or even permit, the exemp-
tion of attorney fees.127 Citing both the Government's success at the
hearing below and the Second Circuit's omission of the issue from its
en banc decision,128 the Court declined to consider whether procedural
due process requires a hearing before a restraining order may be
imposed.
The Court's principal analysis of the Sixth Amendment claims in
Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale was set forth at length in the latter
opinion. In Caplin & Drysdale Justice White, writing for the Court,
noted at the outset that impecunious defendants have no Sixth
Amendment right to choose their attorneys and "have no cognizable
complaint so long as they are adequately represented by [appointed
counsel]." 12 9 He then observed that, unlike the disqualification request
in Wheat, "nothing in § 853 prevents a defendant from hiring the at-
torney of his choice, or disqualifies any attorney from serving as a de-
fendant's counsel."' 30 The burden imposed by the forfeiture statute
was characterized as limited, because it neither prevented the use of
nonforfeitable assets nor imposed any barrier to the ability of defend-
ants "to find lawyers willing to represent them, hoping that their fees
will be paid in the event of acquittal, or via some other means that a
defendant might come by in the future."'131 As to the defendant who is
unable to retain the attorney of the defendant's choice because of for-
127. United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 606-14 (1989). With regard to Judge
Winter's view, the Court observed:
Whatever discretion Congress gave the district courts in §§ 853(e) and 853(c),
that discretion must be cabined by the purposes for which Congress created
[the Act]: "to preserve the availability of property ... for forfeiture." We can-
not believe that Congress intended to permit the effectiveness of the powerful
"relation-back" provision of § 853(c), and the comprehensive "any property
... any proceeds" language of § 853(a), to be nullified by any other construc-
tion of the statute.
Id. at 613.
128. Id. at 615 n.10. In United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1541 (S.D. Fla. 1990),
in which the defendant's assets were frozen as the result of their seizure by troops during
the U.S. invasion of Panama and U.S. requests to foreign governments, the court held
that due process requires an adversarial postrestraint hearing. Id. at 1545-46. The court
noted that there had been neither a grand jury indictment setting forth the requisite
probable cause for seizure, nor an ex parte finding of probable forfeitability by a magis-
trate or other judicial officer. Id. at 1543-44.
129. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989).
130. Id. at 625.
131. Id.
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feiture or threat of forfeiture, no Sixth Amendment objection exists. 132
With reasoning reminiscent of the Fourth Circuit's, the Court added,
"Whatever the full extent of the Sixth Amendment's protection of
one's right to retain counsel of his choosing, that protection does not
go beyond 'the individual's right to spend his own money to obtain the
advice and assistance of. . .counsel.' "13 "A defendant has no Sixth
Amendment right to spend another person's money for [legal] services
.. .",,M4 The Court analogized the situation to that of a robbery sus-
pect who seeks to use stolen funds for attorney fees, noting that seizure
of such proceeds 'would not violate the Sixth Amendment. 135 The peti-
tioner had attempted to distinguish that circumstance on the ground
that, unlike the robbery victim's pre-existing property interest, the
governmental claim to ownership of forfeitable property was created
solely through the fictional device of the relation-back provision. The
petitioner argued that the governmental interest therefore was of lesser
magnitude.
13
6
The Court disagreed. It noted that the property rights created by
the statute are more substantial than the petitioner's argument ac-
knowledged. 137 The relation-back provision reflected an approach
"known as the 'taint theory'. . . that 'has long been recognized in for-
feiture cases,'" including those authorized for violations of the Internal
Revenue Code."8 Thus, "§ 853(c) reflects the application of the long-
recognized and lawful practice of vesting title to any forfeitable assets,
in the United States, at the time of the criminal act giving rise to for-
feiture. 1"39 Far from manifesting only a modest interest in dispossess-
ing a criminal of the proceeds of the wrongdoing, the Government's
legitimate interests extended to the recovery of all forfeitable assets for
their subsequent use in the funding of law enforcement activities.'40
The Government also had an "interest in winning undiminished forfei-
ture [to ensure that all property be returned] to those wrongfully de-
prived or defrauded of it.' 14 1 Finally, a major purpose of the forfeiture
provisions has been to lessen organized crime's economic power. The
132. Id. at 625-26.
133. Id. at 626 (quoting Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S.
305, 370 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner).
137. Id. at 627.
138. Id. (quoting United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1 (1890)) (citing S. REP. No. 225,
200 n.27, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 629 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1988)).
141. Id.
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public interest in stripping criminals of this undeserved power permis-
sibly includes denying them the ability "'to command high-priced le-
gal talent.' -1142
The notion that the Government has a legitimate interest in depriving
criminals of economic power, even insofar as that power is used to
retain counsel of choice, may be somewhat unsettling. But when a de-
fendant claims that he has suffered some substantial impairment of
his Sixth Amendment rights by virtue of the seizure or forfeiture of
assets in his possession, such a complaint is no more than the reflec-
tion of "the harsh reality that the quality of a criminal defendant's
representation frequently may turn on his ability to retain the best
counsel money can buy." . . . [T]he Court of Appeals put it aptly:
"The modern day Jean Vajean must be satisfied with appointed
counsel. Yet the drug merchant claims that his possession of huge
sums of money .. .entitles him to something more. We reject this
contention, and any notion of a constitutional right to use the pro-
ceeds of crime to finance an expensive defense.""
3
The Court concluded that the strong governmental interest in fully re-
covering all forfeitable assets "overrides any Sixth Amendment interest
in permitting criminals to use [those] assets . .. to pay for their
defense."'
' 4
The dissent in Caplin & Drysdale reflected a distinct shift in em-
phasis from Justice Marshall's dissent in Wheat. Justice Blackmun,
joined by Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens, underlined the in-
stitutional goals served by the right to counsel of choice in the analysis
of whether the presumption in favor of defendants' choice had been
142. Id. at 630 (quoting In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 649 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989)).
143. Id. (citations omitted).
144. Id. at 631. The court then observed, with evident approval, that lower courts'
have upheld so-called jeopardy assessments to secure potential tax liabilities against con-
stitutional attack. Id.
The petitioner also asserted that the forfeiture statute was invalid under the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause "because it permits the Government to upset the 'bal-
ance of forces between the accused and his accuser.'" Id. at 633 (quoting Wardius v.
Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973)). Noting that it was "not sure that this contention adds
anything to petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim," the Court rejected the argument. Id.
It characterized the petitioner's claim as focusing upon the potential for prosecutorial
abuse and stated that a due process claim is "cognizable only in specific cases of
prosecutorial misconduct ... or when directed to a rule that is inherently unconstitu-
tional." Id. at 634.
In United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989), the Court also upheld a pretrial
restraint and noted that the restraint was "based on a finding of probable cause to be-
lieve that the assets are forfeitable." Id. at 615.
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outweighed. 145 In the dissenters' view the right plays a "distinct role
. . . in protecting the integrity of the judicial process, a role that
makes 'the right to be represented by privately retained counsel...
the primary, preferred component of the basic right' protected by the
Sixth Amendment.' 14 It "foster[s] the trust between attorney and cli-
ent that is necessary for the attorney to be . . . effective, '147 assures
"some modicum of equality between the Government and those it
chooses to prosecute, 1 48 and serves the broader institutional interests
in assuring a zealous, independent, and at times specialized defense
bar. 49 Characterizing the Court as "paus[ing] hardly long enough to
acknowledge 'the Sixth Amendment's protection of one's right to re-
tain counsel of his choosing,' let alone to explore its 'full extent,' "150
the dissent objected to the Court's implicit finding that the right is "so
insubstantial that it can be outweighed by a legal fiction. '' 51
Although commentators have been troubled by the potential effect
of Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale on the defense bar,'52 the opin-
145. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 635-36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 645 (quoting United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 923 (4th Cir. 1987),
rev'd sub noma. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d
637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), affd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United
States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989)).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 646.
149. Id. at 647-48.
150. Id. at 644 (quoting majority opinion, id. at 626).
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Steve Dettelbach, Recent Development, Forfeiting the Right to Coun-
sel, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 201, 215 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court's use of a
balancing test rather than the strict scrutiny standard when considering the right to
counsel of choice ignores the burden placed on the criminal justice system); Stephen M.
Kightlinger, Case Note, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States: Supreme Court
Approves Attorney Fee Forfeiture, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 471, 485 (1990) (arguing that
the effect of Caplin & Drysdale is potentially devastating to the adversary system be-
cause "[tihe approval of the fee forfeiture system will diminish the ranks of the private
criminal defense bar"). Before Caplin & Drysdale some observers had feared that the
threat of fee forfeiture would impose a serious burden upon the ability of a defendant to
retain counsel. See, e.g., Committee on Criminal Advocacy, The Forfeiture of Attorney
Fees in Criminal Cases: A Call For Immediate Remedial Action, 41 REc. Ass'N B. CITY
N.Y. 469, 478-79 (1985) ("In racketeering and drug cases, counsel have also argued that
unless restraining orders concerning assets of the defendants are lifted so that defend-
ants can pay counsel their fees or so that fees will not be forfeited at the end of the case,
attorneys will withdraw from the case."); Bruce J. Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees
Under RICO and CCE and the Right to Counsel of Choice: The Constitutional Di-
lemma and How to Avoid It, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 765, 775 (1989) ("Application of the
forfeiture statutes in this manner precludes representation by any criminal defense at-
torney with experience in the highly specialized RICO and CCE areas . . . ."); Lisa F.
Rackner, Note, Against Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO: Protecting the Con-
stitutional Rights of Criminal Defendants, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 124, 147 (1986) ("The for-
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ions are illustrative of the problems that can arise from the Court's
failure to explore the underpinnings of the Sixth Amendment right. In
light of the rigorous challenges to the asserted governmental interests,
it was predictable that a consideration of their validity would receive
such attention. The dissenters' criticism of the Court's treatment of
the Sixth Amendment right was, however, certainly justified. Although
the Court intensively focused on the nature of the overriding govern-
mental interest in obtaining full recovery of forfeitable assets, it ne-
glected to discuss the nature or strength of the individual right that
was overridden. In short, because the Court did not express a clear
view of the interests served by the right, Wheat's so-called weighing of
a presumption in favor of the right seemingly became an illusory
formula that is more a means of obscuring a bare conclusion as to the
validity of a governmental interest than a true balancing of competing
values.
More guidance is needed if Wheat is to be implemented in the
many situations in which the right to counsel of choice may be as-
serted. Examination of the more frequent issues reveals a variety of
governmental interests that may be interposed in derogation of a de-
fendant's exercise of the right and a diversity in the efforts of lower
courts to assess such claims properly.
III. AREAS OF APPLICABILITY
Wheat's impact will certainly be perceived in the assessment of
restrictions upon pro hac vice appearances. In its 1979 opinion in Leis
v. Flynt'13 the Court expressly declined to address the issue of a crimi-
nal defendant's interest in retaining out-of-state counsel.' 5' The Court
held only that the denial of an application to appear implicated no due
process interests of the attorney. 5' Nevertheless, anticipation of the
Court's recognition of a Sixth Amendment right prompted the First
Circuit in United States v. Panzardi Alvarez 8' to assess a defendant's
feiture of attorneys' fees will create a severe imbalance in the advocacy of RICO cases.").
Others had questioned the accuracy of this assumption. See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey,
Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: The Impact of RICO and CCE Forfeitures on The Right
to Counsel, 72 VA. L. REv. 493, 510-15 (1986) (questioning whether the threat of fee
forfeiture may have a chilling effect on the willingness of attorneys "to undertake repre-
sentation of RICO and CCE defendants").
153. 439 U.S. 438 (1979) (per curiam).
154. See id. at 442 n.4 (quoting Flynt v. Leis, 574 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1978), rev'd
per curiam, 439 U.S. 138 (1979)).
155. Id. at 443-44.
156. 816 F.2d 813 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1140 (1990). Although
efforts during the pre-Wheat period to articulate the policies served by a perceived right
were rare, Brickey, supra note 152, at 506-07, occasionally some lower courts did attempt
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claim in light of the considerations implicated by that guarantee.
At issue in Alvarez was the implementation of a rule of the United
States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico that permitted
outside counsel to appear in only one case per year. 157 Defendant
Panzardi, charged with drug offenses in two cases, initially hired a local
attorney and then sought to retain a Florida lawyer to serve as co-
counsel on both matters. The trial court approved the out-of-state at-
torney's application for permission to appear pro hac vice and ac-
cepted the attorney as counsel of record in one case, but denied his
application to defend Panzardi in the other. Relying solely upon the
limitation of appearances in the local rule, the district court refused to
allow the attorney to participate in the trial, sit at the counsel table, or
consult with either the defendant or his attorney during the proceed-
ings."'8 Panzardi was convicted and challenged the district court's rul-
ing as a denial of his right to counsel of choice. 159
Observing that the Sixth Amendment requires a court to pay con-
siderable deference to a criminal defendant's choice of counsel, the
First Circuit stated that the right is not absolute. The court added that
the exercise of the right "cannot unduly hinder the fair, efficient and
.orderly administration of justice," nor can it be "manipulated to delay
proceedings or hamper the prosecution."'60 The court noted that the
district court had not suggested any interference and that the out-of-
state counsel had submitted his application to appear pro hac vice
nearly three months before trial.1 1 The court noted that a denial of a
defendant's choice of an out-of-state attorney to appear pro hac vice
could be upheld only after an assessment that "properly balance[s] the
defendant's interest in retaining counsel of his choice against the pub-
lic's interest in the prompt, fair and ethical administration of
justice."'
1 62
The First Circuit found no indication that such countervailing in-
terests had existed before the district court. Recognizing that the dis-
trict court must be able to regulate the conduct of attorneys who prac-
tice before it, the court was nevertheless unable to "discern how a
simple numerical limitation on the number of pro hac vice appearances
per year advances the district court's legitimate interest in regulating
to articulate such policies. See infra note 270 and accompanying text. Such efforts were,
at times, not instructive beyond the context considered. See Rackner, supra note 152, at
136.
157. Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d at 816.
158. Id. at 815.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 816.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 817.
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the conduct of its attorneys.'M8 3
The mere fact that a defendant seeks to retain an out-of-state attor-
ney does not hinder the efficacious administration of justice. His
choice of counsel must be respected unless it would unreasonably de-
lay proceedings or burden the court with counsel who was incompe-
tent or unwilling to abide by court rules and ethical guidelines. 18 ,
The Third Circuit required similar particularized findings in
Fuller v. Diesslin.6 5 Fuller, a post-Wheat decision, involved habeas
corpus review of a New Jersey court's denial of admission pro hac vice
to two out-of-state counsel. 6 ' Charged along with a codefendant with
weapon and drug offenses, Fuller made a motion before the consoli-
dated trial that he be represented by lawyers from Illinois and the Dis-
trict of Columbia. Acting pursuant to a state rule which provided that
such counsel be admitted "at the discretion of the court,"'16 7 the trial
judge denied the request, stating that local counsel was competent to
represent Fuller adequately and that participation by the two out-of-
state counsel would impose a severe inconvenience upon the proceed-
ings.168 In response to Fuller's motion the trial court stated:
[O]ne [lawyer] from Aspen, Colorado [Fuller's codefendant had un-
successfully moved the admission of a Colorado attorney], one from
either D.C. or Illinois, or wherever, plus local counsel, plus out-of-
state defendants. [Defendants were nonresidents, free on bail.] There
are too many unknowns in that equation. It's going to be difficult just
with the out-of-state clients and in-state attorneys to run anything
like a reasonable motion and Appellate schedule... without adding
two lawyers from two different states, who have multiplicity of obliga-
tions and to run it all at the same time.16 9
The trial judge also referred to an imminent air controllers' strike, the
scheduling obligations imposed by speedy trial rules,' and his inabil-
ity to negotiate trial scheduling with out-of-state judges.' 7' The judge
added that the earliest possible trial date would be four or five months
163. Id.
164. Id. at 817-18.
165. 868 F.2d 604 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 203 (1989).
166. Id. at 605.
167. N.J. R. oF GEN. APPLICATION 1:21-2 (1981); see Fuller, 868 F.2d at 606 n.2 (not-
ing that the rule has since been amended).
168. Fuller, 868 F.2d at 605. The district court stated that it was "'satisfied there's
an adequate degree of expertise available in this state to handle any of these motions.'"
Id. at 609 (quoting the district court's opinion).
169. Id. at 612-13 (Weis, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 613 (Weis, J., dissenting).
171. See id. at 610.
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away and that if the disposition of pending motions was delayed and
out-of-state counsel were admitted, "'we're talking earliest disposition
. . . next spring, when the case is a year old and probably longer.' ",172
Accordingly, the judge stated that "'the nature of the probable delay
. . . [that] will occur as a result of this matter . . . is so grave as to
overcome the "unfettered" right of defendant to counsel of his own
choosing.' ,,173 Fuller subsequently pleaded guilty, 74 but reserved the
right to raise the counsel of choice issue on appeal. The habeas corpus
petition followed unsuccessful appeals, and the United States District
Court granted relief, ruling that Fuller had been denied his right to
counsel of choice.
17 5
The Third Circuit viewed the issue as whether the trial judge's
"presum[ption] that the proceedings will be unacceptably delayed
where the defendant is represented by out-of-state counsel" consti-
tuted an arbitrary denial of Fuller's right to counsel of choice.1 76 Turn-
ing initially to the question of whether the Sixth Amendment right en-
compasses the selection of counsel pro hac vice, the court found no
reason for treating a request for such counsel differently than any
other preference for counsel of choice: Such requests are analytically
encompassed within the right, and because the bar is highly mobile
and has at its disposal modern transportation and communication,
they are frequent and likely to increase. Accordingly, the framework
generally employed in counsel of choice cases was applicable.17 7
Reviewing the necessity of balancing the defendant's right against
the requirements of "the fair and proper administration of justice,"'7'
the court emphasized the need to avoid arbitrary denials by conducting
hearings and making "'specific findings of fact consistent with the evi-
dence' as to the suitability of defendant's chosen counsel."' 7 9 The court
172. Id. at 612-13 (Weis, J., dissenting) (quoting the district court's opinion).
173. Id. at 606 (brackets supplied by court) (quoting the district court's opinion).
174. Fuller also had unsuccessfully sought interlocutory relief. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 605.
177. Id. at 607.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 608 (quoting United States v. Rorano, 849 F.2d 812, 820 (3d Cir. 1988)).
The court also was concerned with the proper standard for reversal. See id. at 608-09.
For post-Wheat commentary endorsing this requirement of particularized balancing, see
Thomas C. Canfield, Note, The Criminal Defendant's Right to Retain Counsel Pro Hac
Vice, 57 FORDHAM L. REvIEw 785, 800-01 (1989). After surveying the rules governing ad-
mission to practice pro hac vice, the author observed:
The connection of pro hac vice rules to forum interests is problematic in
the counsel of choice context. Local association requirements often may pro-
mote the defense team's expertise in local law, but cannot be shown to do so in
all cases. No jurisdiction specifies what type of local counsel must be associ-
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examined the trial court's conclusion that adequate representation was
available from local counsel and stated that "as a logical matter, it is
not necessarily true that local counsel will be more knowledgeable
,about the New Jersey law than out-of-state counsel" and therefore the
competence of in-state counsel will not in itself reduce the likelihood of
delay.180 In addition, the court declined to accept the State's assertion
that the existence of adequate local counsel should be dispositive of a
defendant's Sixth Amendment claim, noting that right to counsel of
choice serves significantly different interests in addition to the right to
effective assistance of counsel.181
"[T]he most important decision a defendant makes in shaping his de-
fense is his selection of an attorney. The selected attorney is the
mechanism through which the defendant will learn of the options
which are available to him ...
Attorneys are not fungible, as are eggs, apples and oranges. Attorneys
may differ as to their trial strategy, their oratory style, or the impor-
tance they give to particular legal issues. These differences, all within
the range of effective and competent advocacy, may be important in
the development of a defense. It is generally the defendant's right to
make a choice from the available counsel in the development of his
defense. Given this reality, a defendant's decision to select a particu-
lar attorney becomes critical to the type of defense he will make and
thus falls within the ambit of the sixth amendment.'1
82
Therefore the Government's demonstration of the availability of other
competent counsel was insufficient to defeat the defendant's request.
Instead, the proper concerns to be weighed against a defendant's
choice were those involving the frustration of the proper administra-
tion of justice.1
8 3
Examining the district court's conclusion that the state trial
judge's application of a "'blanket generalization'" concerning travel
and scheduling difficulties represented a" 'failure to scrutinize the par-
ticular case at bar,' "184 the Third Circuit agreed that "the trial court's
ated, allowing the foreign attorney to ally himself with a local attorney who
may have no expertise in criminal law at all. Moreover, in those jurisdictions
requiring only nominal involvement by the local lawyer, a local association re-
quirement provides no clear benefit to the defendant's or state's interests in
avoiding ineffective advocacy.
Id. at 793 (footnotes omitted).
180. Fuller, 868 F.2d at 609.
181. Id. at 610. See infra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
182. Fuller, 868 F.2d at 610 (quoting United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d
Cir. 1979)).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 610-11 (quoting the district court's opinion). According to the district
court, "the record demonstrated that local counsel was unprepared to proceed, but that
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wooden approach and its failure to make record-supported findings"
based on the facts of the case resulted in an arbitrary denial of Fuller's
right.1 8 5 It acknowledged that in Williams v. Nix"8 the Eighth Circuit
had permitted a trial court's presumption that in-state counsel would
allow for a more "'orderly processing of the case,' 1817 but expressly
declined to follow this "more expansive" view of a trial court's discre-
tion.18 The Third Circuit also noted that the State had not presented
a claim of a countervailing state interest for preferring in-state coun-
sel.18 9 This distinguished the case from Bedrosian v. Mintz. °9 0 In
Bedrosian the Second Circuit declined to acknowledge an indigent's
right to the appointment of out-of-state counsel because of the state's
"legitimate interest in developing a pool of competent attorneys to re-
present indigents."'' l In Fuller a vigorous dissent argued that the trial
judge had acted within the scope of his discretion in adequately assess-
ing the difficulties of calendar control on the facts before him.1
9 2
The tendency of both the First and Third Circuits to focus upon
potentially countervailing interests in securing the fair and efficient ad-
ministration of justice involves the very nature of a jurisdiction's power
to authorize and supervise practice before the bar. A state's interests in
requiring "'good moral character or proficiency in the law'" are con-
cerns of similar magnitude. 1 3 Nonetheless, archaic characterizations of
a request for counsel pro hac vice as implicating "not a right but a
privilege" 194 are no longer accurate. Wheat will lead to widespread rec-
ognition of the need for a specific inquiry into whether denials actually
serve such countervailing interests. In Panzardi Alvarez and Fuller the
resolution of the matter was deceptively simple because both courts
concluded that no particularized findings had been made. 95 The more
out-of-state counsel was prepared." Id. at 611. The Third Circuit did not specifically
endorse the finding.
185. Id. at 611.
186. 751 F.2d 956 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1138 (1985).
187. Fuller, 868 F.2d at 612 (quoting Williams, 751 F.2d at 956).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 610 n.5.
190. 518 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1975), cited in Fuller, 868 F.2d at 610 n.5.
191. Bedrosian, 518 F.2d at 401.
192. Fuller, 868 F.2d at 613 (Weis, J., dissenting). The dissent also stated that the
district court had "mischaracterized the trial judge's ruling as resting on per se factors."
Id. at 614.
193. See Ross v. Reda, 510 F.2d 1172, 1173 (6th Cir.) (per curiam) (quoting Schware
v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957)), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975).
194. Thomas v. Cassidy, 249 F.2d 91, 92 (4th Cir. 1957) (per curiam), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 958 (1958).
195. See Fuller, 868 F.2d at 611; United States v. Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813,
817 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1140 (1990).
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difficult issues are suggested by Judge Weis's dissent in Fuller, which
found that the inquiry was properly focused and the countervailing in-
terests were sufficient. Adequate findings that are supported by the
record seem likely to become the norm, and when they do, the manner
in which the balance is struck will depend, as elsewhere, upon just how
weighty the defendant's right to choose seems to be.
Wheat also will affect the issue of disqualification of defense coun-
sel based upon the counsel's prior governmental service. Although it
delineates the "circumscribed" nature of the right to choose, the opin-
ion contains a broad assertion that "a defendant [may not] insist on
the counsel of an attorney who has a previous or ongoing relationship
with an opposing party, even when the opposing party is the Govern-
ment."'96 A reading of this passage that entirely forecloses a Sixth
Amendment right to choose any attorney who has had a relationship
with the prosecutor's office would make little sense. Instead, the Su-
preme Court most likely anticipated the problem of conflicts of interest
arising from prior employment and intended to indicate that in such a
context a defendant's Sixth Amendment right is not absolute.
Such a conflict would implicate the concerns reflected in both Dis-
ciplinary Rule 9-101(B) of the Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity9 7 and Rule 1.11(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.198
As do these standards, pre-Wheat decisions that considered a defend-
ant's right to counsel of choice focused on the former prosecutor's re-
sponsibility for the matter before the court.
For example, in United States v. Smith 9 the Fourth Circuit re-
versed an order that had disqualified a former Assistant United States
Attorney from representing a defendant whose prosecution he had su-
196. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988).
197. Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B) states, "A lawyer shall not accept private employ-
ment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public em-
ployee." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILrrY DR 9-101(B) (1980).
198. Rule 1.11(a), which governs successive government and private employment,
states:
(a) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer shall not re-
present a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer partic-
ipated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the
appropriate government agency consents after consultation. No lawyer in a
firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue
representation in such a matter unless:
(1) the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the
matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
(2) written notice is promptly given to the appropriate government
agency to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this
rule.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11(a) (1990).
199. 653 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1981).
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pervised on a similar but separate charge four years earlier. The attor-
ney's only involvement as prosecutor in the second charge was the
signing of two subpoenas .during the investigation of a codefendant.
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court's finding that the at-
torney had no substantial involvement with the second case and there-
fore was not guilty of any actual impropriety in the representation. 0 0
Nevertheless, because a probationary term from the earlier case was
pending, the district court, citing Canon 9,201 disqualified the attorney
because of the "appearance of impropriety,"20 2 despite its order that
had barred the attorney from representing Smith in any probation rev-
ocation proceeding stemming from the former conviction. 20 3 The
Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court's disqualification could
"only be based on the bald fact that [the attorney] previously prose-
cuted the same defendant on a different charge and that his probation
imposed on the previous charge might be affected by events relating to
the trial in the case sub judice.' '20 4 The Fourth Circuit found no ap-
pearance of impropriety violative of Canon 9.205 Citing Powell v. Ala-
bama,208 the court noted, "A defendant is not lightly to be deprived of
the counsel of his choice. ' ' 20 7 It added, "It cannot be a fanciful, unreal-
istic or purely subjective suspicion of impropriety that requires dis-
qualification. The appearance of impropriety must be real.
20 8
Similar issues have been raised under Canon 9 without reference
to a defendant's constitutional right. In Cleary v. District Court209 the
Supreme Court of Colorado concluded that an allegation of an appear-
ance of impropriety furnished an insufficient basis for disqualifying a
former prosecutor who had no personal involvement, knowledge, or
contact with the prosecution at hand, and to whom such knowledge
could not appropriately be imputed.2 10 The Cleary court observed that
the question of vertical imputation of knowledge21 1 was not present
200. Id. at 127-28.
201. "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety."
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1980).
202. Smith, 653 F.2d at 128.
203. See id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 129.
206. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
207. Smith, 653 F.2d at 128 (citing Powell, 287 U.S. at 53).
208. Id. (citing Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976); Sil-
ver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 589 (E.D.N.Y.
1973), aff'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975)).
209. 704 P.2d 866 (Colo. 1985) (en banc).
210. Id. at 872.
211. Vertical imputation of knowledge involves "the extent to which a superior will
be presumed to have knowledge of information known to and conduct performed by
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and that any presumption of knowledge therefore was merely
rebuttable.212
In United States v. Miller,1 3 a tax prosecution, the Third Circuit
acknowledged the defendant's right to counsel of choice.214 The court
nevertheless affirmed a disqualification order based on an appearance
of impropriety that had stemmed from counsel's unexercised advisory
responsibilities as an Assistant United States Attorney.2 15 The disqual-
ified counsel had been available in the United States Attorney's office
for consultation on all tax cases. The United States Attorney stated in
an affidavit that he expected his assistants to seek the attorney's ad-
vice on tax issues. The affidavit also stated that counsel's law firm had
announced that he had been "Chief of the Criminal Tax Fraud Unit"
within the prosecutor's office. The district court ruled, however, that
the former prosecutor possessed no actual knowledge of the defend-
ant's case.
216
The district's local disciplinary rules incorporated both New
Jersey's disciplinary rules and the state case law interpreting them.
217
In discussing DR 9-101(B) the New Jersey Supreme Court had stated
that "[iun addition to actual knowledge, responsibility, whether exer-
cised or not, over the subject matter is automatically disenabling."218
The New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that its approach was
more restrictive than the approach of the ABA Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility.2 9 Nevertheless, in interpreting this
restrictive state policy, the Third Circuit declined to distinguish be-
tween supervisory responsibility and the advisory role performed by
defendant's counsel. 2 0 Further, the Third Circuit found that the dis-
trict court acted within its discretion in imposing the disqualification.
[A]n informed and concerned private 'citizen could conclude that
[counsel's] appearance on behalf of appellant involved a conflict of
interest with his former responsibilities as an assistant U.S. attorney.
Public confidence in the government's prosecutors is essential, but it
may be lost if former prosecutors assume private employment that ap-
subordinate[s]." Id.
212. Id. at 873.
213. 624 F.2d 1198 (3d Cir. 1980).
214. Id. at 1203 (citing Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1093 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976)).
215. Id. at 1202.
216. Id. at 1199.
217. See id. at 1200.
218. In re Advisory Opinion on Professional Ethics No. 361, 390 A.2d 118, 120 (N.J.
1978) (per curiam), quoted in Miller, 624 F.2d at 1202.
219. In re Advisory Opinion, 390 A.2d at 121 (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975)).
220. Miller, 624 F.2d at 1202.
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pears to involve conflicts of interests. A special concern for avoiding
the appearance of impropriety in this case is justified by the fact that
[counsel's] firm had publicly announced that [counsel] had been
"Chief of the Criminal Tax Fraud Unit within the United States At-
torney's Office.
221
To emphasize that its sole concern was with appearances, the court
added that nothing in its opinion should be read as contradicting the
district court's statement that counsel and his firm had behaved ethi-
cally and were held in the "highest esteem. ' 2 2 The court's considera-
tion of the defendant's right to retain counsel of his choice was cursory,
merely stating that "[a]lthough this right deserves respect, it is not
absolute,' '223 and that the defendant "has not pointed to any particular
harm that might result from his need to retain new counsel."
'224
In United States v. Washington225 the Ninth Circuit declined to
"accept the Third Circuit's reliance [in Miller] upon such a restrictive
reading of the ABA disciplinary rule as a basis for denying a criminal
defendant his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice. '226 The
court did state, however, that "a criminal defendant [does not have] a
right to choose counsel who has an actual conflict of interest because of
prior government employment. '227 The defendant in Washington,
prior to being charged with income tax violations, RICO violations, and
other offenses, 228 retained two attorneys who had formerly served with
the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Justice Depart-
ment (the "Strike Force"). The Government initially moved for dis-
qualification of the attorneys before indictment and attachment of de-
fendant's Sixth Amendment rights. The Government sought to exclude
one attorney on the basis of an allegation by an FBI agent that the
attorney had received unspecified confidential information about the
defendant while serving with the Strike Force. The Government sought
to disqualify the second attorney on the ground that he had occupied a
supervisory position with the Strike Force during the period involved.
The first attorney denied the allegation by affidavit. Both attorneys
asserted that no conflict of interest existed. The trial court denied the
defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing and granted the motion
221. Id. at 1202-03 (footnote omitted).
222. Id. at 1203 n.2.
223. Id. at 1203 (citing Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1093 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976)).
224. Id.
225. 797 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1986).
226. Id. at 1466.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1463. The other offenses were Travel Act violations, mail fraud, and ob-
struction of justice. Id.
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to disqualify both attorneys. The trial court relied on the reasoning of
Miller and concluded that the appearance of impropriety created by
the attorneys' former employment was sufficient to warrant disqualifi-
cation. 22 9 After indictment the defendant asked the court to permit the
attorneys to re-enter the case. The court denied the request on sub-
stantially the same grounds that it had based the initial
disqualifications.230
The Ninth Circuit initially distinguished Miller by characterizing
the attorney in Miller as possessing "informal supervisory responsibil-
ity" over tax cases when the prosecution prepared much of its case.
However, the court then questioned the suitability of an overriding
governmental interest in avoiding an appearance of impropriety that
stems from the mere status of an attorney as a former prosecutor. The
court believed that the trial court had based its ruling upon this
alone.232
The Washington court noted that "the government bears a heavy
burden of establishing that concerns about the integrity of the judicial
process justify the disqualification. '233 The court characterized New
Jersey's reading of DR 9-101(B) as a restrictive and insufficient ground
for denying a defendant the right to counsel of choice.23 '4 The court
added:
We have grave doubts whether an appearance of impropriety would
ever create a sufficiently serious threat to public confidence in the in-
tegrity of the judicial process to justify overriding Sixth Amendment
rights. It is easy to express vague concerns about public confidence in
the integrity of the judicial process. It is quite a different matter to
demonstrate that public confidence will in fact be undermined if crim-
inal defendants are permitted to retain lawyers who worked for the
government in the field of law implicated by an indictment. We are
unwilling to sacrifice a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel
of his choice on such an unsubstantiated premise. Indeed, for all we as
judges know in a vacuum, the public very well may have greater confi-
dence in the integrity of the judicial process assured that a criminal
defendant's right to counsel of his choice will not be lightly denied.
2 3
6
229. Id. at 1464-65.
230. Id. at 1465 n.3.
231. Id. at 1465.
232. Id. at 1466.
233. Id. at 1465 (citing United States v. Phillips, 699 F.2d 798, 801-02 (6th Cir.
1983), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Tosh, 733 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.
1984)).
234. Id. at 1466.
235. Id. The court further noted that the question of an actual conflict of interest
resulting from receipt of confidential information could only be resolved after an eviden-
tiary hearing and findings by a trier of fact. Id.
[Vol 43
32
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol43/iss2/5
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
These divergent views on the significance of an "appearance of im-
propriety" for Sixth Amendment balancing are in part a reflection of
the elastic process of characterizing governmental interests. To recast
an observation made by Justice Black in another context, it is far too
easy to substitute for one asserted interest a broader, abstract, and
more ambiguous description that can expand or contract as the situa-
tion requires.131 In the fee forfeiture cases, for example, the Govern-
ment initially characterized its interests as "the elimination of the eco-
nomic power base of narcotics traffickers ' '23 7 and a "'tool in
combatting two of the most serious crime problems facing the country:
racketeering and drug trafficking.' ",238 Although some elasticity and
even hyperbole may be inevitable, once a valid interest is identified the
issue highlighted in United States v. Washington23 9 still remains: To
what extent does the Sixth Amendment require a demonstrable basis
for concluding that a harm is likely to flow from a defendant's exercise
of the right to select an attorney? Again, the strength to be accorded
the presumption in favor of a defendant's choice would seem to be rel-
evant to the resolution of the problem.
Situations in which disqualification is sought because of allega-
tions of attorney misconduct or incompetence generate far fewer ana-
lytical difficulties. In United States v. Arrington,240 for example, the
Government accused counsel of participating in a plot to silence a wit-
ness. 2Testimony by that witness would have made it virtually certain
that counsel would have had to testify.242 The Second Circuit upheld
both the counsel's disqualification under Disciplinary Rule 5-102(A) 243
236. Discussing the characterization of constitutional rights, specifically the penum-
bral right of privacy recognized by the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), Justice Black stated:
One of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a constitutionally
guaranteed right is to substitute for the crucial word or words of a constitu-
tional guarantee another word or words, more or less flexible and more or less
restricted in meaning. This fact is well illustrated by the use of the term "right
of privacy" as a comprehensive substitute for the Fourth Amendment's guar-
antee against "unreasonable searches and seizures."
Id. at 509 (Black, J., dissenting). This admonition against facile characterization seems
instructive on the description of governmental interests.
237. Brief for the United States at 26, United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74 (2d
Cir. 1987) (No. 87-1397), reh'g en banc, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam), rev'd,
491 U.S. 600 (1989).
238. Id. at 11 (quoting S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191 (1983)).
239. 797 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1986).
240. 867 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 70 (1989).
241. Id. at 123.
242. Id. at 128.
243. Disciplinary Rule 5-102 is entitled "Withdrawal as Counsel When the Lawyer
Becomes a Witness." It states, "If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or
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and the declaration of a mistrial. 44 Responding to the argument that
the client's waiver of his right to conflict-free representation was suffi-
cient to permit the trial to proceed, the court distinguished the nature
of the conflict involved in Arrington from the conflict presented by
multiple representation. "[P]laced in the position of having to worry
about allegations of his own misconduct," counsel would have been
"encumbered with a strong incentive to conduct the trial in a manner
that would minimize [his] own exposure." '45 The court justified its
overriding of the waiver in the same manner as the Court in Wheat v.
United States.2 4 6 The court stated:
"[F]ederal courts have an independent interest in ensuring that crimi-
nal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession
and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them." To
this end, a district court "should not be required to tolerate an inade-
quate representation of a defendant."...
... While the prospect of allowing someone to defend himself
with one hand tied behind his back may present an interesting specta-
cle in a wrestling ring, the court's "institutional interest in the rendi-
tion of just verdicts in criminal cases," and the proper administration
of justice require that a criminal defendant not be so encumbered.
2 7
Pre-Wheat decisions that considered the applicability of a Sixth
Amendment right in other contexts involving allegations of inadequacy
or misconduct of counsel have reached similar results.
248
Other problem areas involve the potential disqualification of coun-
sel that results from issuing subpoenas upon attorneys for investigative
purposes or from the State's calling of the attorney as a witness at
trial. Subpoenas are often issued before attachment of the Sixth
pending litigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to
be called as a witness on behalf of his client, he shall withdraw from the conduct of the
trial . . ." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrTY DR 5-102(A) (1980).
244. Arrington, 867 F.2d at 129.
245. Id.
246. 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
247. Arrington, 867 F.2d at 129 (citations omitted) (quoting Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160,
162).
248. See, eg., United States v. Snyder, 707 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1983) (disqualifying
attorney who was also an indicted co-conspirator); United States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825
(11th Cir.) (per curiam) (disqualifying attorney who allegedly had knowledge of client's
criminal activity that, if brought out at trial, could have created a reasonable probability
of an appearance of impropriety by the attorney in violation of Canon 9), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 906 (1982); United States v. Dinitz, 538 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1976) (disqualifying
attorney for grossly exceeding permissible grounds of opening statement), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1104 (1979); United States v. Rogers, 471 F. Supp. 847 (E.D.N.Y.) (mem.)
(holding attorney with hearing disability incompetent and disqualifying him for dis-
rupting trial procedure), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Raife, 607 F.2d 1000 (1979).
[Vol. 43
34
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol43/iss2/5
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Amendment right.249 In this context courts have been hesitant to de-
velop due process analyses that protect a defendant's choice of coun-
sel.250 Nevertheless, both pre- and postattachment subpoenas have
prompted courts and commentators to express concern for the need to
impose appropriate judicial controls upon a prosecutor's discretion.
2 51
Approaching the issue as an ethical matter, on February 12, 1990,
the ABA House of Delegates amended Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct to provide that a prosecutor shall not subpoena a
lawyer to present evidence about a past or present client in a grand
jury or other criminal proceeding unless:
(1) the prosecutor reasonably believes:
(i) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by
any applicable privilege;
(ii) the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion
of an ongoing investigation or prosecution;
(iii) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the informa-
tion; and
(2) the prosecutor obtains prior judicial approval after an opportunity
for an adversarial proceeding.52
When this approach is not followed, appropriate Sixth Amendment
considerations may be resolved in the context of a hearing upon a mo-
tion to quash.253 At this hearing Wheat would likely require an exami-
nation of factors that bear upon prosecutorial need similar to those
highlighted in the new Model Rule.254 Past decisions that have re-
viewed prosecutorial requests for defense counsel to testify at trial, in-
cluding pre-Wheat decisions recognizing the implication of Sixth
Amendment interests, seem to follow this pattern255 and have occasion-
249. E.g., Roe v. United States, 781 F.2d 238, 242-50 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986); United States v. (Under Seal), 774 F.2d 624, 627-28 (4th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986).
250. See Roe, 781 F.2d at 245-46.
251. See generally United States v. Perry, 857 F.2d 1346, 1347-48 & n.1 (9th Cir.
1988) (commentary cited in dictum).
252. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(f) (1990).
253. See Roe, 781 F.2d at 250.
254. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1988).
255. See, e.g., United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that de-
fense counsel's testimony and consequent disqualification was improper when stipulation
by counsel would have been sufficient); United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.
1984) (holding that inconsistency between attorney's opening statement at trial and
opening statement at earlier mistrial posed sufficient need for disqualification); Grady v.
United States, 715 F.2d 402 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (holding that the calling of
attorney to testify at trial and his consequent withdrawal were permissible because the
testimony tended to establish an element of the Government's case).
1992]
35
Shapiro: The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Choice: An Exercise in th
Published by Scholar Commons, 1992
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ally explored the nature of the particular attorney-client relationship
that was sacrificed.256
IV. POTENTIAL FRAMEWORKS FOR ANALYSIS
Predictably, an examination of the historical antecedents of the
Sixth Amendment reveals a concern with the basic provision of the
assistance of counsel, rather than a narrower focus on the process of
choice. English common law before the Amendment's ratification had
denied counsel to those accused of all felonies except high treason and
misprision of treason, while anomalously providing such assistance to
those accused of misdemeanors. It is noteworthy that the statute which
in 1695 provided for the assistance of counsel in prosecutions for high
treason and misprision of treason left no room for doubt as to the sig-
nificance of the defendant's choice.2 57 The statute stated that any per-
son so tried:
shall be received and admitted to make his ... full defence, by coun-
sel learned in the law ... and in case any person or persons so ac-
cused or indicted shall desire counsel, the court before whom such
person or persons shall be tried . . .shall and is hereby authorized
and required immediately, upon his or their request, to assign to such
person and persons such and so many counsel, not exceeding two, as
the person or persons shall desire.
258
The injustice of providing a right to counsel to one accused of a petty
crime, yet denying it to one charged with a capital offense, was criti-
cized by many, including Blackstone.25 This harsh prohibition had
been ameliorated in practice by the time of the framing of the Sixth
Amendment, at least insofar as it concerned permitting assistance in
the examination of witnesses. 260 However, counsel was not permitted to
plead before the jury.261 It was not until 1836 that a defendant tried for
any felony was granted the statutory right "to make full Answer and
256. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1982)
(recognizing that the attorney had represented the defendant for more than six years in
a substantial amount of litigation and investigation).
257. 7 Will. 3, ch. 3 (1695) (Eng.).
258. Id.
259. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *355. For discussion of the criti-
cism, see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-61 (1932); J.A.C. GRANT, OUR COMMON LAW
CONSTITUTION 8 (1960); BERNARD KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH BAR 108-10
(1908).
260. See GRANT, supra note 259, at 5-9.
261. See id. at 9; 5 COBETr'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 468 n.t
(Thomas B. Howell ed., London, Bagshaw 1810).
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Defence ... by Counsel learned in the Law."2 2 In view of their preoc-
cupation with the glaring deficiencies of English law, the framers of
state constitutions 263 and colonial provisions 2" afforded a right to
counsel, when they did so, in only general terms.
Although the underlying values served by the right to choose did
not emerge from these historical sources, it is probable that the Su-
preme Court will arrive at one of three approaches. First, the Court
may choose to view the right as significant only insofar as it serves the
goal of obtaining a fair trial through effective advocacy. Alternatively,
the Court may adopt an approach similar to that of Justice Blackmun's
dissent in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,265 which
focused upon the institutional goals promoted by the right. Finally,
like Justice Marshall's dissent in Wheat, the Court may view the right
to choose counsel as part of the larger Sixth Amendment interest in
granting criminal defendants control over their own defenses. Although
the values furthered by the latter two approaches are not inconsistent,
important differences in emphasis emerge.
Although, as noted earlier, the Wheat Court probably did not in-
262. 6 & 7 Will. 4, ch. 114, § 1 (1836) (Eng.).
263. See N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XVI, reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 256, 260 (1971) (stating that "[a]ll criminals shall
be admitted to the same privileges of ... counsel, as their prosecutors are or shall be
entitled to"); PA. DECL. OF RTs. of 1776, art. IX, reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra, at 263,
265 (stating that a defendant "hath a right to be heard by himself and his council"); DEL.
DECL. OF RTs. of 1776, § 14, reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra, at 276, 278 (stating that in
all criminal prosecutions "every man hath a right ... to be allowed counsel"); MD. DECL.
OF RTS. of 1776, art. XIX, reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra, at 280, 282 (stating that "in
all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to. . . counsel"); N.Y. CONST. of 1777,
art. XXXIV, reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra, at 301, 310 (stating that a criminal de-
fendant "shall be allowed counsel, as in civil actions"); MASS. DECL. OF RTs. of 1780, pt. I,
art. XII, reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra, at 339, 342 (stating that a defendant "shall
have a right ... to be fully heard in his defence by himself, or his council, at his elec-
tion"); N.H. BILL OF RTs. of 1783, pt. I, art. XV, reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra, at 375,
377 (stating that a defendant "shall have a right ... to be fully heard in his defence by
himself, and counsel").
264. See MASS. BODY OF LIBERTIES § 26 (1641), reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note
263, at 74; PA. CHARTER OF PRIVILEGEs art. V (1701), reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra
note 263, at 173; DEL. CHARTER art. V (1701), reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 193, 195 (William F. Swindler ed., 1979). See generally
Felix Rackow, The Right to Counsel: English and American Precedents, 11 Wm. &
MARY Q. 3, 12-21 (1954) (surveying colonial precedent). A striking exception was a South
Carolina law of 1731, mirroring the language of 7 Will. 3, ch. 3 (1695), that required the
assignment to a person accused of any felony, including treason, "such and so many
council not exceeding 2, as the person ... shall desire." Act of Aug. 20, 1731, No. 552,
§ XLIII [Pt. 1] THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 130 (John D. Cushing
ed., Michael Glazer, Inc. 1981); see Rackow, supra, at 20.
265. 491 U.S. 617, 635 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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tend to isolate the goal of ensuring a fair trial through effective advo-
cacy as the sole basis for the right to counsel of choice, the Court might
someday endorse this position. At least one court, observing that
Wheat should not be so construed, has underlined the principal prob-
lem with such an approach.
In Fuller v. Diesslin2 66 which reviewed the denial of a motion for
the admission of out-of-state lawyers pro hac vice, the Third Circuit
addressed the Government's contention that the availability of effec-
tive local counsel prevented the denial of counsel of choice from rising
to the level of a constitutional deprivation. The court rejected this ap-
proach "because it collapses the right to counsel of choice into the
right to effective assistance of counsel. '2 7 The court believed that
more was at stake in Wheat. It stated:
[E]ven if the right to counsel of choice exists for the purpose of secur-
ing effective assistance of counsel to the defendant, as New Jersey
suggests, the two rights are not identical. We do not understand the
language in Wheat to mean that the right to counsel of choice is im-
portant only insofar as it secures the right to effective assistance of
counsel. Rather, it could be fairly interpreted to mean that, although
the core value in the sixth amendment is effective assistance of coun-
sel, the amendment also comprehends other related rights, such as the
"right to select and be represented by one's preferred attorney."268
A view of the right of choice that focuses only on the goal of pro-
viding effective assistance would render Wheat redundant and reduce
any claim of abridgment to a question of whether the unwanted coun-
sel was effective. If Wheat is to add anything of significance beyond
the well-established and seemingly comprehensive strictures of Strick-
land v. Washington,269 it must mean more. Rather, Wheat's creation of
an additional presumption in favor of defendants' selections of their
own attorneys appears to be designed to further additional values not
otherwise adequately served.
The notion that such choice serves institutional interests which
should not be lightly sacrificed did not originate with the Caplin &
Drysdale dissent. This view had repeatedly surfaced in earlier judicial
opinions, most notably those of the First, Third, and Sixth Circuits.2 70
266. 868 F.2d 604 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 203 (1989).
267. Id. at 610.
268. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159).
269. 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
270. See United States v. Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813, 816 (1st Cir. 1987) (stat-
ing that the denial of the right to counsel of choice creates a risk that trust between
counsel and client will be undermined); Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 279 (6th Cir.
1985) (recognizing that the right to counsel of choice is "necessary to maintaining a vig-
orous adversary system and the objective fairness of the proceeding") (citing United
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While the litigation was pending in the fee forfeiture cases, Professor
Morgan Cloud of Emory University proposed a thoughtful, dualistic
model for analyzing the issue of institutional interests.271 His model
takes into account both the function of criminal defense counsel in our
criminal justice system and the interests of the defendant. As Professor
Cloud pointed out, consideration of the institutional role of counsel is
often intertwined with an analysis of the rights of a defendant in our
adversary system.272 But his view that these institutional functions are
themselves deserving of independent protection seems to have com-
mended itself to the Caplin & Drysdale dissenters in their considera-
tion of the impact of fee forfeiture.273 Regardless of whether the insti-
tutional value of criminal defense counsel is characterized as a truly
independent and constitutionally cognizable interest, this approach
highlights the fact that the individual's right does not exist in a vac-
uum and that the consequences of an abridgment for the system will
have consequences for the defendant as well.
The problem with the approach of the Caplin & Drysdale dissent
is that, in failing to sufficiently address the nature of the defendant's
personal interest, it is subject to the interpretation that institutional
values occupy a position of primacy. Such a view-and one would
doubt that, after their Wheat dissent, Justices Marshall and Brennan
would have acceded to it without some commentary-would threaten
to stand the Sixth Amendment on its head. The Sixth Amendment
confers personal rights. That is its spirit and its logic. 27 4 It is "the ac-
cused" who, "[iln criminal prosecutions, . . . shall enjoy the right...
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. ' 27 5 To the extent
that the right to counsel confers institutional benefits upon society,
those consequences warrant consideration. But they remain by-prod-
States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981)); Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209 (6th
Cir. 1981) (stating that denial of counsel of choice undercuts the trust between counsel
and client), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982); United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 57
(3d Cir. 1979) ("IT]he ability of a defendant to select his own counsel permits him to
choose an individual in whom he has confidence.").
271. See Morgan Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees: Applying an Institu-
tional Role Theory To Define Individual Constitutional Rights, 1987 Wxs. L. REv. 1
(1987) [hereinafter Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees]; see also Morgan Cloud,
Government Intrusions Into the Attorney-Client Relationship: The Impact of Fee For-
feitures on the Balance of Power in the Adversary System of Criminal Justice, 36 EM-
ORY L. J. 817 (1987).
272. Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees, supra note 271, at 7.
273. The dissent was aware of Professor Cloud's article. See Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 638 n.5, 642 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
274. Cf. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975) (stating that right to counsel
is a "personal character upon which the Amendment insists").
275. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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ucts of the framers' judgment that such worthwhile goals as institu-
tional fairness could best be served by conferring rights upon defend-
ants, who may use or waive the rights after examining their interests in
our adversarial system.
In his Wheat dissent Justice Marshall viewed the acknowledgment
of a distinct and constitutionally protected interest in a defendant's
choice of an attorney ultimately as stemming from a noninstitutional
value. Specifically, the interest stemmed from a recognition of the
Sixth Amendment's vision of a defense effectively managed by the de-
fendant.2 7 This approach still offers the most plausible explanation for
Wheat's methodology and is most consistent with comprehensive Sixth
Amendment theory. Justice Marshall noted that the right of the ac-
cused to make a defense, recognized in Faretta, stems from this com-
mon value.
2 7 7
In United States v. Curcio275 Judge Friendly had a similar view of
the relevance of Faretta and its acknowledgment of the "inestimable
worth of free choice. '27 9 Some five years before Wheat Judge Friendly
examined a claim that the choice of joint representation involved a
right of constitutional dimension and observed that the choice, "like
that of self-representation, is at once strategic and moral. '280 Noting
that "the defendants' choice is to be honored out of respect for them as
free and rational beings, responsible for their own fates," he observed
that "[t]he resolve of the [defendants] to stand before the law together,
• ..no less than Faretta's resolve to stand before the law entirely
alone, is worthy of constitutional protection."281 Wheat's methodology
for evaluating a potential conflict of interest has superseded the ap-
proach of Curcio, but similar observations concerning the pedigree of
the right of choice have been echoed elsewhere.
282
Faretta reflected a vision of the Sixth Amendment that has sel-
276. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 165-66 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
277. Id. at 165.66.
278. 694 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1982).
279. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
280. Curcio, 694 F.2d at 25.
281. Id. The court emphasized the significance of the defendants' right to conflict-
free representation and concluded that the trial court had improperly foreclosed joint
representation. Id. at 22-28.
282. See, e.g., Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 279 (6th Cir. 1985) ("[R]ecognition
of the right ... reflects constitutional protection of the accused's free choice . . .)
(citing Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984)); United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d
52, 56 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating that given the vast differences in attorneys, "a defendant's
decision to select a particular attorney becomes critical ... and thus falls within the
ambit of the sixth amendment"); Winick, supra note 152, at 799, 806-10 (urging the
application of strict scrutiny rather than the balancing approach of Wheat and aptly
characterizing the right as embracing "participatory and autonomy" values).
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dom been matched in its breadth, viewing the assistance of counsel as
a vehicle in service of a broader scheme. As "surely there can be no
doubt that [those who wrote the Bill of Rights] understood the inesti-
mable worth of free choice,' 2 8 3 the very right to defend was deemed
"personal,12 4 with the assistance of counsel serving as an aid in the
effort. 288 Justice Marshall's observation that the right to counsel of
choice and the right to conduct one's own defense stem from this com-
mon source renders the Court's observation in Wheat-that Faretta's
right to self-representation does not encompass the right to
choose-inapposite. 288  Neither Wheat nor the Court's subsequent
opinions adequately address the source of the right, and lower courts
that reach a conclusion similar to Justice Marshall's are left with the
task of extrapolating bits and pieces from Faretta, the views of indi-
vidual justices, and their own conceptions of the nature of the Sixth
Amendment.
This Article is premised on the assumption that the Court's articu-
lation of the values underlying the right to counsel of choice can and
will make a significant difference in its implementation. This premise
seems to comport with common sense. If, for example, the right is
grounded principally in its service of institutional values, these values
are more likely to dissipate in the face of countervailing institutional
needs. If, however, as one suspects, the Court recognized the right be-
cause it is a manifestation of the value that the Sixth Amendment
places upon individual autonomy and dignity, the right is far less likely
to be balanced away or its deprivation deemed harmless.
28 7
283. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 833-34.
284. Id. at 834.
285. Id. at 820.
286. See Winick, supra note 152, at 810.
287. In this regard, an analogy to the Court's treatment of the right to self-represen-
tation might well be of limited value. In McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984), the
Court stated that the denial of the right to self-representation is not amenable to
"'harmless error'" analysis "[s]ince the right of self-representation is a right that when
exercised 'usually increases the likelihood of a trial outcome unfavorable to the defend-
ant." Id. at 177 n.8. Nevertheless, in Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1985), the
court concluded that respect for the individual, served by both the right to self-represen-
tation and the right to counsel, required that these rights be "respected or denied irre-
spective of the harmlessness or prejudicial nature of the error." Id. at 286 (citing McKas-
kle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984)). The court quoted language from Justice White's
McKaskle dissent regarding the traditional harmless error doctrine as peculiarly inappo-
site in the self-representation context because of defendants' moral rights to choose their
own fate. Id. at 286 n.19 (quoting McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 198 n.6 (White, J., dissenting)).
See also Fuller v. Diesslin, 868 F.2d 604, 609 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 203 (1989)
(similar standard governing arbitrary denials); United States v. Rankin, 779 F.2d 956,
960 (3d Cir. 1986) (viewing the language of Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259
(1984), as instructive on the issue).
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The present situation is less than desirable. Lower courts remain
charged with the responsibility of implementing a balancing process
with little guidance as to the magnitude of the personal interests at
stake. Wheat and its progeny leave one with a sense of lost opportu-
nity and perhaps even of judicial ambivalence of a right freely ac-
knowledged but only grudgingly explained. Hopefully this phenomenon
is short-lived, and the Court will soon find the opportunity to clarify
just what it is about the Sixth Amendment that compels the recogni-
tion of a right to counsel of choice.
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